Risk-Taking Incentives, Governance, and Losses in the Financial Crisis (Chesney M., Stromberg J., Wagner A. F.)

Bank Managers Corporate Governance in Banking Financial Crises Risk-taking and Risk Management Too-Big-To-Fail

Abstract This paper studies the extent to which risk-taking incentives of CEOs and other governance features in a range of years prior to the recent financial crisis were related to the write-downs of U.S. financial institutions during the crisis. We document that institutions whose CEOs had particularly strong risk-taking incentives, weak ownership incentives and independent boards had the highest write-downs, both in absolute terms and relative to total assets. Furthermore, financial institutions with lower Tier-1 ratios and those with CEOs who earned less than their colleagues at comparable firms had larger write-downs.
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Libref/ Chesney M., Stromberg J., Wagner A. F. (2010) "Risk-Taking Incentives, Governance, and Losses in the Financial Crisis", Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 10-18, pp. 1 - 48
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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