Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence (Japelli T., Pagano M.)

Bank Lending Bank-Borrower Relationships Information Asymmetry and Transparency Regulation

Abstract Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. We construct a new international data set on credit bureaus and public credit registers. The theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with our data. We also study why central banks often supplement private arrangements by creating public credit registers and distribution of information about borrowers` credit histories. Public intervention is more likely where creditor rights are poorly protected and private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously.
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Libref/ Jappelli T., Pagano M. (1999) "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence", IDB Working Paper No. 106, pp. 1 - 39
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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