Financial Liberalization and Contagion with Unobservable Savings (Panetti E.)

Contagion in Banking Information Asymmetry and Transparency Interbank Markets Liquidity

Abstract How do market-based channels for the provision of liquidity affect financial liberalization and contagion? In order to answer this question, I extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation to a two-country environment with unobservable markets for borrowing and lending and comparative advantages in the investment technologies. I demonstrate that the role of hidden markets crucially depends on the level of financial integration of the economy. Despite always imposing a burden on intermediaries, unobservable markets allow agents to partially enjoy gains from financial integration when interbank markets are autarkic. In fully liberalized systems such effect instead disappears. Similarly, in autarky the distortion created by hidden markets improve the resilience of the system to unexpected liquidity shocks. With fully integrated interbank markets, such effect again disappears, as unexpected liquidity shocks always lead to bankruptcy and contagion.
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Libref/ Panetti E. (2011) "Financial Liberalization and Contagion with Unobservable Savings", MRPA Paper No. 29540, pp. 1 - 41
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