The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy (Baker D., McArthur T.)

Regulation Too-Big-To-Fail

Abstract One outcome of the TARP and other bank rescue efforts following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 is that the United States has essentially formalized a commitment to a “too big to fail” (TBTF) policy for major banks. This paper uses data from the FDIC on the relative cost of funds for TBTF banks and other banks, before and after the crisis, to quantify the value of the government protection provided by the TBTF policy.
External link Download
Libref/ Baker D., McArthur T. (2009) “The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy”, CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs, No. 2009-36, pp. 1-5
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
    Дизайн — переработанная версия стартовой страницы ГУ–ВШЭ.