Why Do (or Did?) Banks Securitize Their Loans? Evidence from Italy (Affinito M., Tagliaferri E.)

Bank Lending Liquidity Risk-taking and Risk Management

Abstract This paper investigates the ex-ante determinants of bank loan securitization by using different econometric methods on Italian individual bank data from 2000 to 2006. Our results show that bank loan securitization is a composite decision. Banks that are less capitalized, less profitable, less liquid and burdened with troubled loans are more likely to perform securitization, for a larger amount and earlier.
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Libref/ Affinito M., Tagliaferri E. (2010) “Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy”, Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 741, pp. 1-44
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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