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Unstable Equity? Combining Banking with Private Equity Investing (Fang L., Ivashina V., Lerner J.)

Investment Banking

Abstract Theoretical work suggests that banks can be driven by market mispricing to undertake activity in a highly cyclical manner, accelerating activity during periods when securities can be readily sold to other parties. While financial economists have largely focused on bank lending, banks are active in a variety of arenas, with proprietary trading and investing being particularly controversial. We focus on the role of banks in the private equity market. We show that bank-affiliated private equity groups accounted for a significant share of the private equity activity and the bank’s own capital. We find that banks’ share of activity increases sharply during peaks of private equity cycles. Deals done by bank-affiliated groups are financed at significantly better terms than other deals when the parent bank is part of the lending syndicate, especially during market peaks. While bank-affiliated investments generally involve targets with better ex-ante characteristics, bank-affiliated investments have slightly worse outcomes than non-affiliated investments. Also consistent with theory, the cyclicality of banks’ engagement in private equity and favorable financing terms are negatively correlated with the amount of capital that banks commit to funding of any particular transaction.
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Libref/ Fang L., Ivashina V., Lerner J. (2010) “Unstable Equity? Combining Banking with Private Equity Investing”, HBS Working Paper № 10-106, pp. 1-44
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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