Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees (Hardy D.C., Nieto M.J.)

Bank Profitability Bank Systems Regulation Stability&Soundness

Abstract We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.
External link


Libref/ Hardy D.C., Nieto M.J. (2011) "Cross-Border Coordination of Prudential Supervision and Deposit Guarantees", Banco de España Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1126
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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