What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily? (Kondo K.)

Bank Systems Information Asymmetry and Transparency Ratings

Abstract This paper examines what types of Japanese regional banks are more likely to obtain credit ratings at the present time when disclosures by financial institutions are becoming more and more important. We found that banks in more competitive markets, those that have larger assets, and those whose bad debt ratio is lower are more likely to disclose credit ratings. It was also revealed that regional banks in the same region (prefecture) as other banks that go bankrupt often feel it necessary to actively demonstrate their own solidness in the market by obtaining foreign credit ratings. We also analyzed whether regional banks that disclose more credit ratings succeed in obtaining financing from depositors. Our results indicate that regional banks that obtain more credit ratings, in particular foreign ratings, succeed in increasing their bank balances.
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Libref/ Kondo K. (2010) ''What Promotes Japanese Regional Banks to Disclose Credit Ratings Voluntarily?'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30, No.2, pp. 1-14
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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