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The Certification Role of Bank Directors on Corporate Boards (Cau G., Stacchini M.)

Bank-Borrower Relationships Corporate Governance in Banking

Abstract There is a large literature on the effects of the presence of bankers on firms'boards as these bankers may reduce monitoring costs by facilitating information flows between the lender and the borrower, may credibly certify the financial soundness of the firm to other creditors who are not represented in the board and may act as financial experts for the management. At the same time, lending bankers on boards may have a conflict of interests. In this paper, we study the impact of the presence of bankers on firms' boards on interest rates charged to firms. We have two results.;First, as interest rates on loans from the board director's bank and from other banks are very similar we do not find evidence of a conflict of interests effect. Second, we have strong evidence of certification effects played by bank directors as rates charged by all banks on loans to firms with bankers on boards are lower than those charged by all banks to firms without bankers. The certification effect is even stronger if the banker on board has itself loaned to the firm.
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Libref/ Cau G., Stacchini M. (2010) "The Certification Role of Bank Directors on Corporate Boards", MoFiR Working Paper No. 46, pp. 1 - 30
© Программирование — Александр Красильников, 2008
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